Monetary and fiscal influences on economic activity : the foreign experience by Michael W. Keran
0NE OF THE major current debates among econ-
omists and policymakers in the United States and
abroad deals with the relative importance of monetary
and fiscal influences on economic activity. This de-
bate reflects a growing awareness of the importance
of monetary policy in any stabilization program. In
part, this awareness stems from the intellectual re-
surgence of the quantity theory of money as an
explanation of short-run movements in economic
activity. In the main, however, it is probably due to
the surprising number of recent historical experiences
in which monetary actions have seemed to be effec-
tive and fiscal actions have seemed to be ineffective.
The two episodes best known to the American pub-
lic are the tight money-easy fiscal policy conibina-
tion of 1966 which preceded the mini-recession in
early 1967, and the easy money-tight fiscal policy
combination of the last half of 1968 which was fol-
lowed by continued economic boom in 1969. Similar
experiences have occurred in other countries. In early
1968, for example, the United Kingdom had an easy
money-tight fiscal policy combination and experienced
a continued economic boom in the second half of
1968 and through early 1969.
This Review has recently published two articles
analyzing the relative impact of monetary and fiscal
influences on economic activity in the United States.1
‘Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization” in the November 1968 issue of this
Review, pp. 11-24; and Michael Vi’. Keran, “Monetary and
Fiscal Influences on Economic Activity —The Historical Evi-
dence,” in the November 1969 issue of this Reeiew, pp. 5-24.
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The conclusions reached in both articles were that
monetary influences havehad a larger, more predicta-
ble, and faster effect on economic activity than fiscal
influences. If the relationship observed in the United
States reflects an important and stable underlying
phenomenon, then one would expect that similar re-
lationships would exist in other countries with roughly
similar economic institutions. The intent of this article
is to investigate comparable monetary and fiscal in-
fluences on economic activity for a selected group
of foreign countries.
According to many authorities, the most desirable
quality of any empirically-estimated equation is its
accuracy in forecasting the future. According to
Christ,2 “the ‘future’ should be interpreted to include
anything unknown to the forecaster when lie did his
work.” Thus, a significant test of the equation de-
veloped with respect to the United States would be
to subject it to tests using data from other countries.
With this in mind, this article should he viewed as
an attempt not only to increase our understanding
of monetary and fiscal relations in particular foreign
countries, but also to provide an independent test
of the “forecasting ability” of equations developed
for the United States.
2Carl F. Christ, Econometric Models and Methods, (John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966). “Thus, a person might forecast
some aspect of nineteenth century behavior by means of
theory and data derived solely from the twentieth century,”
page 5. “Is there any truth in the maxim that prediction
provides the acid test? The answer is yes. (If) ...we con-
front the model with an entirely new set of data which we
were not familiar with when the model was chosen,” page 547.
Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Economic Activity:
The Foreign Experience
by MICHAEL \V. KERAN
The November 1968 and November 1969 issues of this Reviuw included articles winch developed
and explained in some detail a procedure for testing the relative importance of monetary and fiscal in-
fluences on economic aciwity in the United States. The conclusions reached in those articles were that
(except for the years covering World V/ar II) monetary influences had a stronger, more predictable,
and faster impact on economic activity than fiscal influences.
This article w’esents additional empirical evidence on the monetary - fiscal issue on the basis of data
from eight foreign conntries, The analysis of this’ foreign experience tends to confirm the results obtained
for the United States. Because the test procedure is identical with that used and described in some detail
in the previous articles, this article is devoted mainly to presenting and describing the empirical evidence.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
This article will deal with these issues in the follow-
ing order: first, a brief consideration of the test pro-
cedures; second, consideration of the data problems
in making empirical tests of foreign countries; third,
presentation of the statistical results; fourth, testing
various propositions; and finally, some general obser-
vations on the role of monetary influences on eco-
nomic activity.
The Test Procedure
The basic form of the equation used to test the
relative impact of monetary and fiscal influences on
economic activity is the same as that used in the
previous articles in this Review. 1.”he general form of
the test equation is:
= a0 + aj~M+ a2AF,
where: AY is a measure of changes in economic activ-
ity; ~M is a measure of changes in monetary influ-
ences; ~F is a measure of changes in fiscal influences;
a! and am are symbols which represent the magnitude
of the impact of monetary and fiscal influences, re-
spectively, on economic activity; and a0 represents
the average impact of all other influences on eco-
nomic activity during the same period.
The earlier articles presented a detailed discussion
of the relative advantages and disadvantages of this
“single equation” approach as opposed to alternative
approaches to measuring monetary and fiscal influ-
ences.3 That discussion will not be repeated here.
The procedure employed in this article is to test
two variables which are usually considered to be
under the control of the monetary and fiscal policy-
makers to see which variable has the dominant impact
on economic activity. These variables are not neces-
sarily those which are consciously controlled by policy
makers. Rather, the variables tested are those which
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both the Modern Quantity theory and the Keynesian
Income-Expenditure theory would imply are the best
measures of the impact of monetary and fiscal actions.
Because this approach omits di,’ect consideration of
the channels through which the monetary or fiscal
effects operate, it cannot he used to answer questions
about the underlying structure of the economy.
Foreign Data Problems
When American researchers attempt to collect data
on some facet of the American economy, they are
doubly blessed. First, the United States publishes
more statistics in greater detail and generally of
greater accuracy than other countries. Second, expert
knowledge of the sources and reliability of the data
are readily available.
In general, neither th0 quantity nor quality of
foreign data are as good as that for the United States.
Furthermore, the American research worker is un-
likely to be as familiar with the sources of foreign
data as with domestic data,
Apparently, only four countries besides the United
States have quarterly GNP data: Canada, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. For reasons dis-
cussed in the Appendix, GNP results for the United
Kingdom are not used in the main body of this
article. For the United Kingdom and the other coun-
tries in our survey group, for which quarterly GNP
data were not available, namely, Belgium, France,
Italy, and the Netherlands, economic activity was
measured on the basis of a proxy variable. The proxy
variable for economic activity is equal to the scaled
product of the seasonally adjusted industrial produc-
tion index and the consumer price index4 times
GNP in the base rears of those indexes. As is shown
in the Appendix, the proxy variable gives substan-
tially the same implications for monetary and fiscal
actions as the GNP measure hs those countries in
which both measures are available.
Using GNP data where available, and the proxy
where GNu data was not available, provides quar-
terly measures of economic activity for eight of the
mafor foreign industrial countries which have reason-
ably decentralized economic systems, and therefore
come closest to paralleling the American economic
system. For purposes of comparison, updated results
from earlier studies on the United States are also
presented.
~The consumer price index is not seasonally adjusted. The
exact fomsula is presented in the Appendix.
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One point should he emphasized. The “single equation”
approach used here does not provide any direct evidence
about whether the Keynesian Income-Expenditure theory or
the Modern Quantity theory is the most appropriate explana-
tion of national income. ‘rhe reason for this is because the
“single equation” test used in this article does not discrimin-
ate between the behavioral assumptions of the two theories.
See Keran, pp. 6-8 for further discussion of this and re-
lated issues, It is theoretically possible to have a strong
and prompt monetary influence on economic activity in a
Keynesian model. Such a model \vas estimated empirically
by J. Ernest Tanner in “Lags in the Effects of Monetary
Policy,” American Economic Review, December 1969.
A single equation test of behavioral assumptions of The
Quantity Theory and Income-Expenditure Theory, was made
by Milton Friedman and David Meiselman in “Relative
Stability of Income Velocity and Investment Multiplier in
the United States, 1868-1960,” Stabilization Policies, Prentice
hall, 1963. The September 1965 issue of the American
Economic Review is devoted to a searching discussion of the
Fniedman-Meiselmaim results.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY, 1970
The nneasure of monetary influence used for each
country was the money stock as defined by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in its international
Financial Statistics. This was the only monetary vari-
able which was available quarterly on a consistent
basis for all countries.a However, it would be desira-
ble in future research to try other monetary variables,
such as the monetary base or total reserves of the
banking system.
The most serious data problems were encountered
in developing an appropriate fiscal variable. Possible
measures of the fiscal influence are total Government
spending (including transfer payments as well as pur-
chases of goods and services), high-emnployment tax
receipts, the differences between government spend-
ing and high-employment tax receipts,°and changes
in the national debt. Data on high-employment tax
receipts and on the national debt were not available
for any of the countries. Of necessity, therefore, the
only measure of fiscal influences used in this paper is
total Government spending culled from Treasury sta-
tistics on cash outlays including transfers to Govern-
ment corporations. The Government component of
the National Income Accounts could not be used for
two reasons: 1) it included only purchases of goods
and services; and 2) it included expenditures at all
levels of government. Even on this basis, fiscal meas-
ures were available for only three countries. By co-
incidence, they were the same countries which had
GNP data: Canada, Germany, and Japan.7
This limited measure of fiscal influence may not be
as serious a liability as it appears. Experience with
United States data indicates that Government spend-
ing is the best measure of fiscal influences.~However,
it does mean that further research on fiscal influences
could possibly change the results presented in this
article. For Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom, no consistent quarterly fis-
cal variable was available. For these countries only
monetary influences on economic activity were
measured.
tm
It could be argued that different definitions of the money
stock would be appropriate for different countries because
of different institutions. This is a reasonable proposition. How-
ever, a consistent IMF definition of money was used for two
reasons: (1) the author is not familiar enough with the in-
stitutions in each country to reformulate the money stock
definition; (2) the author did not want to be accused of
choosing the data source on the basis of that which best
supported his hypothesis.
“Actual Government spending need not he adjusted for the
high-employment concept because the differences would be
conceputally small. On the other hand, the difference be-
tween actual and high employment tax receipts can he
conceptually large. See Keith Carlson, “Estimates of the High-
Employment Budget,” this Review, June 1966. 7
Fiseal data were available for the United Kingdom from
1962 hut are not included here for reasons given in Ap-
pendix II.
~Andersen and Jordan, pages 17 and 18.
The results reported in this article are based on the
data and sources described. However, it is conceiv-
able that some sources of data may have been over-
looked which could have improved, or perhaps modi-
fied, the results presented.°
Statistical Results
The summary results of the regression analysis in
both first and central difference form, using the Almon
distributed lag technique,bO are presented in Tables I
and II, In the case of first differences, the quarter-to-
quarter change from period (t-1) to period (t) is
labeled as the change at period (t). In central dif-
ference form, the average change from (t-1) to
(t+1) is labeled as the change at period (t ) - Al-
though the first difference form is the usual method
of presenting “change” data, the central difference
form more closely approximates the economic con-
cept of “change” at a point in time.mm
Table I includes those countries in which economic
activity is measured by GNP and in which the fiscal
influence is mneasured by total central Government
spending. Table II includes those countries in which
economic activity is measured by the proxy variable
and in which a fiscal variable was not available. In
the Appendix, the validity of the proxy variable is
discussed and it is shown that it gives substantially
the same result as when GNP is used to measure
economic activity. For those who are unfamiliar with
interpreting statistical results as presented in Tables I
and II, a description of the Ganadian first difference
°Thesources of all data used in this article are listed at the
end of the Appendix. tmtm
ln each test the formn of the equation was estimated with
money alone, fiscal alone, and a combination of the two.
Alternative tOne lags between (t-1 ) and (t-6) were tried.
The form of the equation selected and the time lags to
represent each time period were chosen on the basis of
minimum standard error of estimate adjusted for degrees
of freedom.
The Almon lag technique, by constraining the distribution
of coefficients to fit a polynomnual curve of (a) degree, is de-
signed to avoid the bias in estimating distributed-lag co-
efficients which may arise from multicollineanity in the lag
values of the independent variables. The theoretical justi-
fication for this procedure is that the Almoa constrained
estimate is superior to the unconstrained estimate because it
will create a distribution of coefficients which more closely
approximates the distribution derived from a sample of in-
finite size. In order to luinimize the severity of the Almon
constraint, the maximum degree of the polynomial was used
in each case. The maximum degree is equal to the number
of lags plus one of the independent variables up to five
lags. Following the convention established by Shirley Al-
moo, “l’he Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropria-
tions and Expenditures~,” Econometnica, (January 1965),
if there are (a) lags, (t+1) and (t-n-1) are both con-
strained to zero. l’he regressions ~vere also run without
constraining the beginning and ending values to zero, and
the results are virtually identical.
“For a further description and justification of cenfral differ-
ences, see John Kareken and Robert Solow, “Lags in Mone-
tary Policy,” page 18, in Stabilization Policies, Prentice Hall,
1963.
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results in Table Iis provided.12
Others may proceed to the sec-
tion titled “Presentation of
Results.”
How to Read the Statistical
Results — The time period (11/
1953-IV/1968) for Ganada indi-
cates the period during which
the dependent variable (AGNP)
is explained by the monetary
and fiscal variables. The lag
(t-6) indicates that it takes the
contemporary and six lagged
quarters for the monetary and
fiscal influences to have their
full effect on the economy.
At the top of Table Ii sa n
equation similar to that de-
scribed on page 17. Changes in
Gross £‘ ational Product (AGNP)
is the variable to be explained.
Changes in the money stock
(AM) and changes in Govern-
ment expenditures (AE) are the
variables which are postulated
to explain AGNP.13 a, is the symbol for the measured
influence of AM on AGNP, holding AE unchanged,
and a0 is the symbol for the measured influence of AE
on AGNP holding AM unchanged, a0 represents the
estimated trend value of all other influences on AGNP,
The columns of numbers in Table I under ai and
a2 represent the statistically estimated value of the
average relation between the monetary or fiscal influ-
ence and AGNP for various countries. In the case
of Canada, 4.27 is the estimated monetary coefficient,
which implies that on the average, for every $1 in-
crease in the money stock, there will be a $4.27 in-
crease in GNP over the current and six following
quarters. The number below, enclosed by a paren-
theses (5.75), is the “t” statistic, which is a measure
of the statistical confidence one may have that the
estimated coefficient has the same sign as the “true”
coefficient relating AM to AGNP. The larger the “t”
statistic, the greater our confidence in the value of
the estimated coefficient. ln general, an estimated
coefficient svith a “t” statistic larger than 1.96 is signi-
‘
2
1t should be kept in mind that this description is highly
simplified. Those who are interested in a more complete and
rigorous explanation of statistical hypothesis-testing should
consult any elementary textbook in statistics.
‘
5
AE rather than AF is used here as a symhol of the fiscal
influence because the specific measure used in this case is
changes in Government expenditures. ~F was a surrogate
for any measure of fiscal influence.
ficantly different from zero, and a “t” statistic smaller
than 1.96 is not significantly different from zero at
the 95 per cent confidence level, The convention
in economics is to make the 95 per cent confidence
interval the boundry between acceptance or rejection
of the coefficient as significantly different from zero.
Thus, in the case of Canada, the statistical results in-
dicate that the monetary influence is positive and
highly significant.
The estimated coefficient for the fiscal influences
for Canada is —1.45. The implication is that for every
$1 increase in Government expenditures, there will
be a $1.45 decrease in GNP after six quarters. This
negative relation is contrary to the generally assumed
relation between Government spending and GNP.
However, the “t” statistic of (1.38) indicates the esti-
mated fiscal coefficient is not statistically different
from zero, and consequently this result is not persua-
sive evidence that Government expenditures are per-
verse in their effect on economic activity. The R2 is
the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees
of freedom.tm4 It is .43 for Canada. This means that
m
4
The degrees of freedom of an equation are equal to the
number of observations of the dependent variable minus
the number of independent variables, including the con-
stant term. In the Canadian case, there were 63 observa-
tions of ~GNP from 11/1953 to IV/1968 and there were 7
independent money variables (one contemporary and six
lagged), and 7 independent fiscal variables plus one con-




MONETARY AND FISCAL INFLUENCES ON AGNP
AONP = uo . utAM
Monetary Fiscal
Co,,sior,t ir’fluuncns influences
T;me Term a, am
~aur.iry Pe.,iod Loac a’. (sum 1 (sum) D~W
Fint Duly r~, nres-Biiiions of Notional Currency)
car.cjda 11.1953 V’lQóB t.6 .33 4.27 1.45 .43
(3.271 (5.75) (1.38) 220
C.trrrany ill 1961 - iil’1968 t.3 326 8.88 .68 .39
(.76) (2.85) 1.41) 2.27
Japan 11956 III 1968 t 2 .33 2.78 .81 .56
1.25) 15.26) 11.75) 1.94
Unitc.d States 1,1954 . III .1969 1-4 3.19 5.50 .01 .67
(4.2?) (8.30) (.02) 1.82
l~ent’olDifferences . Biuians of National Currency)
Canada II. 1953 - IV 1968 t.6 .32 482 2 13 .67
(4.911 (9.32) 12.8Cl 1.48
Grrmany III 1961 III,.1968 1-3 . 4 20 10.44 .33 .54
(1.31) (4.84) (23) 1.70
Japan 1,1956 . 111/1968 t 2 . .04 2.68 1.46 .66
1.37) 14.77) (2.96) .74
United Slates I, 1954 . III 1969 F-4 3.14 535 .11 .79
(5.64) (10.79) (.47) 1.17
- lt,gr. ‘ic,,. ,‘‘,‘~ls’c.r’,.s’.’in. I’’: ‘cr,’- - t.’’i —t.slj sir— hn,r’sssr F,,I,.~ ‘-artms t-.-,-lus,-’u.
ns. sarsai,i,. ‘,,.isi. I:
she ‘‘I’ r.,’it,’’t \c:.,Ll :5’.. D.\\ ~
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43 per cent of the variation in AGNP can be ex-
plained by variation in the monetary and fiscal vari-
ables, AM and AE.
Considering that the statistical estimates were made
on the basis of quarterly first differences, which mag-
nifies the random elements in the data, an fi2
= .43
is considered to be reasonably high. D-W (the Durhin-
\Vatson statistic) is a measure of randomness in the
error term of the estimated equation. An acceptable
range for the 1)—W statistic in these equations would
be roughly hetween 1.25 and 2.75.15
Presentation of Results — Table I shows the sum-
mary regression results for Canada, Germany, Japan
and the United States, using changes in quarterly
GNP as a measure of economic activity, in each
case the results are presented in both first difference
and central difference form. Central difference data
are, in effect, a two-term moving average of first
difference data. Thus, central differences have con-
sistently higher 112 than first differences because some
of the random movements which are so promi-
nent in first difference data have been averaged out.
This also has the effect of reducing the randomness
of the error term and thus reducing the value of the
Durbin-Watson statistic.’”
The regression results in Ta-
ble 1 give sl.lbstantially consist-
ent implications with respect to
monetary influences. In every
country the coefficient for the
monetary variable is positive
and statistically significant in
both first and central difference
form. On the other hand, the
fiscal variable does not exert an
influence which exhibits any
systematic pattern for the vari-
ous countries. For Canada the
fiscal variable is insignificant in first differences and
negative and significant in central differences. For
Germany and the United States, it is statistically in-
significant in both first and central difference form.
For Japan, the fiscal variable is statistically insignifi-
cant in first diffei-cnces and positive and statistically
significant in central differences. These results contrast
sharply xvith those for the monetary variable where,
for each country, and for both first and central dif-
ferences, the monetary coefficient is positive and
statistically significant.
The other countries in this study do not have quar-
terly GNP estimates which can be used as a measure
of economic activity. For those countries economic
activity is measured by the proxy variable defined
above and justified in the Appendix.
In Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom (before 1962), acceptable meas-
ures of fiscal influence are not available. For these
countries, it was only possible to measure monetary
influences on economic activity. This is done in Table
II with quarterly observations from 1953 to 1968,
using both first and central difference form.
Table II
MONETARY INFLUENCES ON A PROXY MEASURE
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (AY}
a . aiAM
Constant Monetary
Time lerm Influences Dummy pm
Country Period loge a,, - a- Sum) Varab!e D W
(First Differences - Billions of Notional Currency)
Belgium II 1953 - IV- 1968 5-3 3.00 2.57 23.60 28
(1.02) (308) (3.19) 2.36
France II. 1953 - IV’1968 1-2 3.17 209 98.81 .82
(1.31) (2.551 (15.58) 1.44
Italy II. 1953 - IV 1968 t 3 .19 1.87 .42
(1.96) (5.61) — 2.37
Netherlands II 1953 - IV, 1968 1-5 .01 6.02 .33
.04) (5.3!) — 1.64
Un’ed Kinqdom II ‘1953 IV- 1968 t-6 .2! 1.41 .35
(3.12) (2.63) — 1.99
(Central Diffetences Billions of National Currency)
Beiqis.m II 1953 - IV 1968 t3 105 31/ 17.77 .46
I .55) (5.83) (3.76) 1 36
Franca II 1953 - tV/i 968 t 2 .02 3.25 34 16 .36
101) 13.401 (4.39) 1.65
Italy II 1953 - IV1968 16 19 1.75 66
(3.14) (/921 —— 1.75
N. Iherlands II 1953 - IV, 1968 •-5 - .07 6.62 .42
.32) (6.69) -— 81
United Kngdacn II. 1953 IV 1968 t6 .20 1.46 .48
13.31~ (3.861 .91
I~.-sr—‘‘.1-~i~’l.~ I’,,i,-l .I.s.I,.I:,. I.,I,Ovt —r,-~- Ii’s—i ~ r I‘n,.,- I,,-,,,ri.-t,, —
It, it..-:’; .,-I..’~:lr, -
— —I,‘—ic’.’ ..s~.s’-’...:,..,.!:.-n, ‘1,5’. -.‘~:.r;. ‘.,., lt.w. ,,. It .,rs,:’’— ~‘5t5 ,...l — I;t~I.— Its-.
S-ho ,,,,‘li t -- m.Ilrr.t.’l—’-. I--I:, ‘~ rl~’.~’ s’’’iSPI .‘.5.~ I’i~~l’l I tc,,,,-—,~r.‘~‘‘‘f r’.-’i..fl’.
lSThis is based on the assumption
of 40 observations and 5 independ-
ent variables. One could reject auto
correlation in the error term (lack
of randomness) if the Durbin-
Watson statistic is in the range
1.79-2,21. The inconclusive range
goes as low as 1.25 and as high as
2.75. The inconclusive range would
he narrowed with more observa-
tions and widened with more
independent variables.
‘~There seems to be a systematic
trade-off between first and central
differences, with the latter having
higher R
2
’s (which is desirable)
and lower D—W statistics ( which
is sometimes undesirable).
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In the case of Belgium and France, dummy varia-
bles were added to account for major nation-wide
strikes.17 In Belgium, there was a nation-wide strike
in December 1960 and January 1961 which closed
down most major industries. To account for this non-
monetary influence on economic activity, a dummy
variable was included which assumed the value of
—1 in IV/1960-I/1961 and a value of +1 in 11/1961.
For all other periods the dummy variable had a value
of zero. In France, there was a nation-wide strike in
May 1968 wInch shut down virtually all industry. As
monetary influences would not be expected to explain
this phenomenon, a dummy variable was included
which assumed the value of —1 in the second quarter
of 1968 and +1 in the third quarter of 1968. The
dummy variable assumed a value of zero for all other
quarters. For France the statistical significance of the
dummy variable was substantial in first differences
and much less so in central differences, because the
impact of the strike was partially averaged out in
central difference data. Consequently, the high B2
for French first difference results (.82) should be
partially discounted.
Although the monetary influence is statistically sig-
nificant for every country in this study, there is a
substantial degree of variation in the estimated value
of the monetary influence between countri~s.For ex-
ample, in first-difference form the monetary variable
for Germany is 8.88, and for the United Kingdom it
is 1.41. This range of values is largely due to varia-
tions in institutional factors in each country, such as
the level of per capita income, the traditional pay-
ment period for workers, and the number and avail-





Germany 8 88 6.60
United States 5 50 4.56
Canada 427 514
Japan 2.78 3 60
Netherlands 6.02 4.22
Belgium 2.57 2.8$
france 2 09 2.96
Italy 1 87 2.23
On ted Kingdom L41 2.70
These institutional factors can substantially ‘nflu-
ence the amount of money stock requir.d to induce
a given change in economic activity. One rough meas-
ure of the institutional differences between countries
is the observed ratio of the money stock to income
l
7
There were undoubtedly random events in other countries
which could have been accounted for with dummy
variables.
(the income velocity of money). As can be seen
in Table III, the estimated value of the monetary in-
fluence for each country (a1), is closely associated
with the income velocity of money.
The monetary influence values are derived from
first-difference results in Tables I and II. The values
for velocity (GNP/M) are calculated on the basis of
annual GNP and money stock data for 1968. These
results indicate that the monetary influence values
are substantially influenced by the institutional fac-
tors which determine velocity in each country. I-low-
ever, as these institutional factors seem to change
only slowly over time, the monetary influence values
arc relatively stable within each country.
The results presented in Table II, where monetary
influences alone are measured, are consistent with the
results in Table I in which both monetary and fiscal
influences are measured. The monetary influence is
positive and statistically significant in all countries
considered in both first and central difference forms
of the equation. The R2’s are sufficiently high to
infer that monetary influences explain a significant
amount of the change in economic activity in these
countries. Every substantial movement in money is
followed by a roughly proportional movement in
economic activity.
The results presented in Tables I and II indicate
that in nine of the major industrial countries of the
world, monetary influences play an important role in
determining the short-run movements in economic
activity.
Testing Propositions
Three propositions with respect to monetary and
fiscal influences were tested in earlier articles on the
basis of United States results. These propositions con-
sidered whether monetary or fiscal actions were (1)
stronger, (2) more predictable, and (3) faster-acting.
The conclusion reached with respect to the United
States was that monetary actions dominated fiscal
actions in each proposition.
These same propositions will be tested for foreign
countries in which both monetary and fiscal measures
are available; that is, Canada, Germany, and Japan.
In addition, updated results for the United States
will be presented as a basis for comparison.
Which is stronger? — To measure the relative
strength of monetary and fiscal influences during the
test period we need to kmìow which has had the
largest impact on economic activity. If the monetary
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I Beta coeffioc a are uai to th turated coefficient tintes the
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and fiscal measures had the same dimension and the
sante average degree of variation, the test could be
made by directly comparing the size of the estimated
coefficients of the monetary and fiscal variables. As
these conditions are not satisfied, the estimnated co-
efficients cannot be used directly for this test. How-
ever, when the estimated coefficients are “normalized”
by being converted into beta coefficients, they can
be compared.18 The “sum” beta coefficients for Can-
ada, Germany, Japan, and the United States are
presented in Table IV for both first and central dif-
ference form.
The results indicate a considerable degree of con-
sistency between countries, In every country for both
first and central differences, the beta coefficients for
the monetary variable are substantially larger than
that for the fiscal variable. In every case the sign of
the monetary variable is positive (a change in money
leads to a change in GNP in the same direction), and
the values are statistically significant. The sign of the
beta coefficient for the fiscal variable varies between
countries andis statistically significant only for Canada
and Japan in central difference form, However, the
values of the fiscal coefficients in these t~vocountries
are opposite in sign, indicating a lack of cross-country
consistency. Clearly, for the time periods and coun-
tries considered, monetary influences have had a
stronger impact on economic activity than have fiscal
influences.
Which is more predictable? — The best-known
measure of the predictability of the monetary and
fiscal influences on economic activity is the “t” statistic.
‘5Beta coefficients are equal to the estimated coefficient times
the standard deviation of independent variable over the
standard deviation of the dependent variable. See Arthur
S. Goldberger, Economic Theory, (John Wiley and Son.s,
1964), pp. 197-98.
As indicated above, the “t” statistic is a statistical
indicator of the confidence one may have that the
“true” relationship between the independent and the
dependent variables has the same sign as that of the
statistically estimated relationship bet\veen those vari-
ables. The larger the “t” statistic, the more confidence
one may have that the monetary and fiscal variables
are predictably related to economic activity. The sum
“t” statistics of the monetary and fiscal coefficients
included in Table I are reported separately in Table
V for both first and central differences. Again, the
results are remarkably consistent between countries.
In every case the “t” statistic for the monetary co-
efficient is larger than the “t” statistic for the fiscal
coefficient. As a crude indicator of the relative preci-
sion of coefficient estimates, the absolute value of the
average “t” statistic of the monetary variable is 41/2
times larger than that of the fiscal variable. Thus,
for the four countries considered, the monetary varia-
ble is substantially more predictable in its effect on
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Which works faster? — The relative speed of mone-
tary or fiscal influences can be measured by observing
which variable has the shorter time lag in influencing
economic activity. For comparability, the quarterly
patterns of the estimated beta coefficients are used.
The beta coefficient results were derived from the
same set of statistical results summnarized in Table I,
Only the first difference results are plotted in Chart
I. Almost identical patterns of beta coefficients are
obtained with the central-difference fonn, Again,
the quarterly pattern of the monetary influence on
economic activity is remarkably stable for different
countries. In contrast, the quarterly pattern of fiscal
influence on economic activity varies substantially be-
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between countries. For each country, the
effects of the monetary influence substan-
tially outweigh the effects of the fiscal
influence in the contemporary quarter,
except for the case of Japan. In Japan,
where the fiscal influence has had the
largest overall positive association of any
of the countries considered, the monetary
influence outweighed the fiscal influence
in the first and second lagged quarters.
The general impression from observing
the quarterly pattern of the beta coeffi-
cients is that monetary influences tend
to have a faster impact on GNP than fiscal
influences for these four countries.
The results of testing these three prop-
ositions about monetary and fiscal influ-
ences on economic activity for Canada,
Cenuany, and Japan are consistent with
the results obtained from earlier studies
on the United States.
Additional Observations in the
Money-Economic Activity Relation
Two points should be kept in mind in
interpreting these results:
1) Monetary influences have a large
and systematic influence on economic
activity. Because pohcymakers can con-
trol the money stock, monetary policy
should play a central role in any success-
ful stabilization policy.
2) The high degree of statistical as-
sociation between monetary influences
and economic activity should not be
taken to imply that there are no other
systematic influences operating on eco-
nomic activity. Economic activity can be
influenced by a wide range of factors which are
independent of monetary influences. A demonstration
of this fact is that the degree of variation in economic
activity, explained by monetary influences is less than
perfect.
Both of these points can be highlighted with exam-
ples from three countries.
Germany — Chart II illustrates that from 1954 to
1964, German nionetary influences were relatively
stable as measured by the quarter-to-quarter changes
in the money stock. With the exception of a moderate
deceleration in 1959 and 1.960, no cyclical pattern can
be observed in the money stock. Economic activity
during the 1954-64 period also exhibited a relatively
stable growth rate. However, there were several mod-
erate fluctuations with cyclical troughs in 1958, 1960,
and 1962. Yet only the trough in 1960 was associated
with restrictive monetary influences. Although none
of these cychcal moventents in economic activity
/ / ~//I\////// // / / / / / /,.. / 7. . — ‘//
M ,T 4*~ / // tti~
/ //// //// / // \/\//////,
/ /~//\/ D/~/\ //~ / /,,Js \vt
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were sufficiently strong to have been generally con-
sidered a recession, they illustrate that cyclical move-
ments in economic activity do occur independently
of monetary influences.Th
German developments in the 1965 to 1969 period,
moreover, provide an example of the strength of mon-
etary influences when they are allowed to operate. In
late 1965 and in 1966 the German monetary authori-
ties followed a systematically restrictive policy, as
indicated by the steady deceleration of the money
stock. This monetary action was, in part, a response
191’his raises an important point in statistical estimation pro-
cedures. A regression analysis on Gennan data from 1954
to 1964 would not have shown a statistically significant
association betiveen moaetary variables and economic activ-
ity. The method of computing statistical association is that
variations in one variable are observed to occur systematic-
ally with variations in another variable. If there is little or
no variation in monetary variable, then the statistical re-
gression procedures ‘vill not measure any significant relation
with economic activity.
to fears of domestic inflation, although in the main it
was due to concern over deterioration of the German
international trade position.2° TIns restrictive mnone-
tary policy was followed by a substantial deceleration
in economic activity in late 1966 and 1967. As the
international trade position impi-oved, monetary pol-
icy was eased, and the money stock accelerated in
1967 and 1968. Economic activity responded promptly,
resuming the rapid growth rates of earlier years.
The 1966-67 business cycle trough was widely recog-
nized in Germany as a period of recession, and its
cause can he clearly traced to the, actions of the
mnonetary authorities,
German postwar experience illustrates t\vo things:
first, stable monetary influences do not exclude the
possibility of cyclical instability in the economy; and
second, fluctuating monetary influences seemingly in-
duce fluctuations in economic activity.





2 ‘S ‘ ‘~1 chad K ran Monetary Polic Balancc of Pay-
ment and Busine s Cycle The loreiga Expcricnc ‘ this
Review November 1967.
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Italy — Chart III illustrates that the Italian experi-
ence in the post-war period is similar to that of Gcr-
many. Front 1953 to 1957, monetary influences in
Italy were stable and economic activity grew at a
relatively stable rate, xvith some irregular quarter-to-
quarter movements. From 1958 to 1962 the money
stock accelerated and, correspondingly, economnic
activity accelerated. Because of a deterioration in
their international trade position in 1962 and 1963, the
Italian monetary authorities followed a tight money
policy in 1963 and early 1964. Their actions caused
a sharp deceleration in economic activity in late 1963
and into 1964. When the money stock was permitted
to accelerate in the second half of 1964, economic
activity expanded in line with its previous growth
rate. Italy has had stable growth in both money and
economic activity since 1965, despite its \videly pub-
licized political turmoil.
Japan — The Japanese experience contrasts with that
of Gennany and Italy in its more frequent reversals
of monetary actions, as shown in the lower tier
of Chart IV. This monetary behavior has appar-
ently caused all postwar business cycles in Japan to
he dominated by monetary considerations. Japan has
had four cyclical troughs: in 1954, 1957, 1962, and
1965. Each of these troughs was preceded by a de-
celeration in the money stock and each recovery
with an acceleration in the money stock. All sys-
tematic movements in economic activity in Japan
have been related to monetary considerations. From
1965 to 1968, Japan followed a stable monetary policy
and, as a result, economic activity has also grown at
a relatively stable rate until very recently.
The Japanese experience reinforces the points made
above. Although stable monetary influences do not
guarantee stable growth in economic activity, un-
stable monetary influences seem to assure fluctuations
in the growth of economic activity’.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to review the
postwar economic experience of a variety of industrial
countries to see whether monetary and fiscal influence
bear any systematic relationship to movements in
economic activity. The results presented indicate that
in spite of admitted differences in economic institu-
tions and differences in the objectives of policymakers
between countries, a substantial degree of consistency
is observed. For each of the eight foreign countries
considered, the monetary influence was important.
The estimated coefficient relating the monetary varia-
ble to economic activity \vas positive and statistically
significant. Of the countries in which fiscal measures
It is important to keep in mind that these results,
especially \vith respect to fiscal influences, are even
more tentative than is generally the case in statistical
estimations of economic relations, because of the se-
vere data limitations discussed above.
With this caveat the implication of this study is
that our confidence in the results of earlier studies
were available, only in Japan was the positive relation
postulated by economic theory found to hold.
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which xs’ere based on United States data, is enhanced.
The single equation approach to mneasuring monetary
and fiscal influences on economic activity, which
was developed for the United States, has passed the
“forecasting test” mentioned at the beginning of this
article. That is, time recent economic experience of a
number of industrial countries can be better under-
stood by the use of this equation.
Previous research xvhich concluded that monetary
influences are important in detcnnining time short-
run movements in economic activity’ is confirmed by
the results obtaimtecl for other countries.
This article is available as Reprint No. 52.
The Appendix to this article develops the case for using a proxy
measure of economic activity for those countries in which quarterly
GNP data are not available. The Appendix also considers the special
case of the United Kingdom.
APPEN]MX
Comparing Nominal C.”’)2 and. a Proxy
Measure of Economic Activity
Nominal GNP is a measure of the market value of all
goods and services produced in an economy dum-ing a
particular time period. It is the most broad-based measure
of economic activity available. But since quarterly CNP
data are not available for many important countries, a
proxy for economic activity was constructed and used in
some cases. This alternative measure is equal to the
scaled product of the consumer price index ( CPI ) and
industrial prodbmction index (WI) times CNP. The form-
ula for comnputing the proxy for economic activity (Y) is:
y = (CPI._IPI \ GNP,
\ 10,000 /
where the value of GNP is that in the base year of
the price aml production indexes.
The proxy measure of economic activity has a much
narrower base than CNP. The price component of the
proxy ~vas measured only by the consumner price index
(CPI). llowever, the CPI tends to move quite closely
with movements in the implicit GNP price deflator for
those countries in which we have both data series, The
real component of the altermiative measure is based on
the seasonally midjusted industrial production index, which
means that all service industries, levels of government,
andl agriculture are not included.
Despite these limitations, this measure of economic
activity is a useful first approximatioml for the purposes
of business cycles analysis. Its usefulness is indicated in
Table VI, where economic activity is measured by our
proxy variable and by mmomniual GNP for those countries
in which both series are available. As can be seen, the
indicators of nionetary and fiscal influences give con—
sistentlv the same results with these different measures
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ECONOM C ACTIVITY, MEASURED BY A PROXY than that for aCNP. In the United States and Germany
tAn AND BY NOMINAL GNP (AGN?) the B2 is higher for AGNP than it is for the proxy variable
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activity is measured by AGNP or AGDP, neither the
monetary nor the fiscal influences are statistically signifi-
cant, and the amount of variation in economic activity
explained by these variables is only 5 per cent and 2 per
cent, respectively, in first difference form,
Quite clearly, when economic activity is measured in
first difference form, the proxy variable (ÀY) gives an
entirely different assessment of the influences of monetary
and fiscal variables than does AGNP or AGDP. These
differing results using alternative measures of economic
activity are not observed for the other countries in this
study. For every other country ÀY and AGN? gave sub-
stantially the same results with respect to the monetary
and fiscal variables.
An investigation of the time series of GNP and the
proxy measure of economic activity provides at least a
partial explanation for this discrepancy. Both series show
the same basic cyclical pattern in first-difference form.
However, the CNP series has a small number of quar-
terly observations which dcviate siihstantially from the
proxy measure series. This is especially true for the third
and fourth quarters of 1963, the first and second quarters
of 1967, and the second and third quarters of 1968.
These deviations tend to be offsetting, that is, a sharp
decline in one quarter is matched by a sharp increase
in the next quarter. With only 27 observations in the
sample period, even six atypical observations can distort
the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.
These atypical observations could be due to the fact
that both the CNP and CDP data have greater meas-
urement error than the data which underlies the proxy
measure of economic activity. Both the industrial pro-
duction and consumer price indexes are monthly series
which are averaged to compute quarterly proxy meas-
ures. The measurement error possibility is consistent with
the very large Durbin-Watson statistic (3.18) for first-
difference results of both CNP and GDP, which implies
a high degree of negative auto-correlation in the error
term. When central differences are taken of the GNP
and GD? data, the consequences of random-measure-
ment error in the series are reduced. The offsetting
movements in the quarterly values AGNP and AGDP
are considerably lessened.
Measuring monetary and fiscal influences against
central differences (see bottom half of Table VII), one
observes that both the monetary and fiscal variables are
statistically significant with respect to GNP, and the
explained variation of AGNP rises to 30 per cent. The
value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is also in a less
unacceptable range than in the first difference results.
Computing central differences for AGDP does not im-
prove the results significantly from the first difference
results.2
These results suggest that perhaps a proxy variable
may be superior to GNP or GDP as a measure of economic
activity, if there is less measurement error in the proxy
variable than in the other measures of economic activity.
The relatively short period from 1/1962 to 111/1968
was used for the regressions in Table VII because total
2
M. J. Artis and A. B. Nobay, ‘Two Aspects of the Monetary
Debate,” ia National institute of Economic Review, August
1969, report similar results with respect to AGDP.
government spending data \vere not available in earlier
years. A longer time span encompassing a wider range
of economic events (1953-68) was used in the main
body of the article to analyze monetary influences in the
United Kingdom.
Data Sources
For each country the seasonally adjusted series for the
industrial production index, Gross National Product,
money stock, and Government expenditures were used.
The consumer price index is not seasonally adjusted.
Belgium — Industrial production index and consumer
price index, 1963=100; Main Economic indicators,
OECD; Money Stock: international Financial Statistics,
IMF.
Canada — Industrial production index and consumer
price index, 1983=100; Main Economic indicators,
OECD; Gross National Product: Canadian Statistical Re-
view, Dominion Bureau of Statistics; Money Stock:
international Financial Statistics, IMF; Government Ex-
penditures: Canadian Statistical Review, Dominion
Bureau of Statistics,
France — Industrialproduction indexand consumer price
index, 1963 100; Main Economic indicators, OECD;
Money Stock: international Financial Statistics, IMF.
Germany — Industrial production index, 1963=100;
Main Economic indicators, OECD; consumer price index,
1962zr 100; Monthly Statistical Supplements, Deutsche
Bundesbank; Gross National Product and Money Stock:
international Financial Statistics, IMF; Government Ex-
penditures: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Italy — Industrial production index and consumer price
index, 1963= 100: Main Economic indicators, OECD;
Money Stock: international Financial Statistics, IMF.
Japan — Industrial production index and Consumer price
index, 1965=100: Basic Data for Economic Analysis,
1969, Bank of Japan; Gross National Product: Annual
Report on National income Statistics, Economic Planning
Agency of Japan; Money Stock: Economic Statistics
Monthly, Bank of Japan; Government Expenditures:
Basic Data for Economic Analysis, 1969, Bank of Japan.
Netherlands — Industrial production index and con-
sumer price index, 1963 = 100: Main Economic indicators,
OECD; Money Stock: International Financial Statistics,
IMF.
United Kingdom — Industrial production index and
consumer price index, 1963 = 100: Main Economic Indi-
cators, OECD; Money Stock: International Financial Sta-
tistics, IMF; Government Expenditures: United Kingdom
Financial Statistics.
United States — Industrial production index, 1957-59=
100: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
consumer price index, 1957-59100: United States De-
partment of Labor; Gross National Product: United States
Department of Commerce; Money Stock: international
Financial Statistics, IMF; Government Expenditures:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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